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Response: Real world energy policy 
by Matthew Hunter, President & CEO, Central Maine Power Company 
Making energy policy is nothing like building models on your tabletop, where all the 
components are plainly marked, the pieces fit neatly, painful surprises are rare, and mistakes 
don't affect vital parts of your life. 
Silkman and Flumerfelt lucidly remind us that the design challenge for energy (and most other) 
policy is that the institutions, forces, and behaviors of the real world are often only vaguely 
visible, hard to measure or forecast, linked to one another in complicated and unexpected ways, 
and bristling with hidden costs and trade-offs. 
For example, narrow-focus, pure-extrapolation predictions that make no allowance for reactions 
to events are almost guaranteed to miss the mark. One reason that predictions of $100-a-barrel 
oil never came true is that people reacted to the predictions by seeking efficiency, substitutes, 
and increased supplies. As a result, oil prices collapsed. Effective policymaking allows for 
reactions, countervailing forces, and unforeseen consequences. 
Tunnel-vision pursuers of single objectives overlook this truth, in the same way that homeowners 
who get carried away with sealing air leaks discover that neither their woodstoves nor their lungs 
can get enough fresh air. 
Discussions of energy policy sometimes proceed in an oxygen-starved environment that can dull 
enthusiasts' sensitivity to real-world considerations. With its focus on costs and consequences, 
the Silkman-Flumerfelt essay is a breath of fresh air in an area heavy with ritual incense. 
Central Maine Power (CMP) agrees with the essay's diagnosis and prescriptions. The job of this 
response isn't to argue with the authors. It's to reinforce their point and to suggest one other 
policy initiative and pose one policy question that might benefit electric utility customers. 
Customers are understandably concerned about recent trends toward higher electric rates. They 
might find it illuminating, if not comforting, to take note of the Silkman-Flumerfelt review of 
causes:  
• Increasing efficiency and the economic recession require recovering more fixed costs in 
the price of each unit of energy sold.  
• Federal and state requirements for buying non-utility energy lead to additional increases 
in rates. 
• Conservation programs can have large initial costs that force rates up. 
• Non-economic mandates for environmental protection or other social goals translate into 
rate increases that fund no perceptible change in the service customers are buying. 
• The tension between customers' demands for adequate and reliable service, and their 
opposition to having power lines and other facilities in their vicinity, adds to the time and 
expense of improving and expanding the electric system. 
The authors' discussion of the cost consequences of federal and state policy promoting non-
utility generation illustrates the difficulty of reconciling policy goals with customers' interest in 
affordable and stable prices. As they note, the pressure for utilities to sign up projects before an 
effective, competitive auction had been designed to discipline prices led to some commitments 
for high-priced purchased energy that will be affecting CMP customers for some years yet, until 
those contracts expire. 
An easy, policy-enthusiast response to that observation would be to say that even the early 
purchases were necessarily of benefit to customers because they were set at or below the 
"avoided costs" calculated at that time for utility resources. But a peculiar aspect of the policy for 
setting avoided costs, one not noted in the Silkman and Flumerfelt article, is that CMP's 
regulators determined that the resources that would be avoided by non-utility purchases would 
include the Seabrook Unit 2 reactor - a project that then-joint-owner CMP was voting to cancel, 
and which clearly was never going to be an energy resource of any kind, let alone an avoided 
resource. 
The authors are also sensibly alert to the danger that the pursuit of efficiency can be carried so 
far as to burden the customers it is intended to help. Like other economic goods, efficiency isn't 
free. Many efficiency improvements with short paybacks or high internal rates of return still 
require significant up-front outlays. Even if electric customers are using the same discount rate 
as policymakers are using (normally, customers' revealed discount rates are much higher than 
any analyst's) gaining energy efficiency can require cash outlays that they view as burdensome, 
whatever the long-term advantage. 
The outlays are even more burdensome when customers make them through electric rates to pay 
for programs that aren't immediately benefitting them. That's why CMP has supported the idea of 
amending the current regulatory benchmark for cost-effectiveness of demand-side programs 
(whether they reduce the net present value of the utility's revenue requirement) to place greater 
weight on the rate impacts they create for customers. 
Silkman and Flumerfelt note that Maine energy policy "has been driven by two objectives: (1) a 
reduction in our state's dependence on oil and other non-renewable energy resources, and (2) a 
reduction in our overall consumption of energy through energy conservation programs, 
incentives, and other initiatives." 
Just as the state at large has greatly reduced its reliance on oil, so has CMP. Between 1980 and 
1990, the percentage of kilowatt-hours generated from oil for CMP customers fell two-thirds, 
from forty-eight to sixteen percent. For the first half of 1991, the oil-fired percentage of CMP 
energy generated stood at less than nine percent. 
However, CMP still maintains modern oil-fired units that total nearly 600 megawatts of 
generating capacity - more than a third of our system capability. 
While we've reduced our dependence on oil-fired power, we retain the option to use it. As the 
long-term CMP Energy Resource Plan recently filed with the Maine Public Utilities Commission 
demonstrates, that is not a bad thing. That significant in-place capacity, burning low-sulfur oil in 
a time of low oil prices, constitutes a valuable peak-demand resource for our customers. 
We can offer a similar clarifying caveat on the other policy motive the authors mention, reducing 
overall energy use. 
Energy, while very important, is just one of many inputs to the economy. There's no obvious 
reason to assume that reducing energy use is a goal that ought to be pursued with no 
consideration to whether the costs of reduced use outweigh the advantages, even if the energy 
sources involved are non-renewable. 
Maine could greatly reduce the use of fossil fuel, for example, by banning cars and mandating 
the use of bicycles in all urban areas and on interstate highways. That would save fuel, but 
greatly increase the time and expense of moving goods and people; that time and those dollars 
would become unavailable for use in producing other goods like education and health care. We'd 
be grossly worse off as a state for taking such a one-dimensional view of the virtue of reducing 
energy use. 
Energy is a scarce commodity. The fact that it has a price tells us that. But by that same test, so 
are labor, physical and financial capital, entrepreneurship, time, and other economic inputs. 
Sensible policy shouldn't try to dictate the input composition of economic activity without 
reference to the costs of different mixes. As Silkman and Flumerfelt argue, the better approach is 
to promote price signals that encourage optimizing the mix as circumstances change, and use 
regulation to modify demand in light of obvious-but-unpriced costs like environmental pollution. 
As they point out, many energy policies have been based on assumptions and predictions that 
were shredded by experience and have produced unintended and perverse consequences. More 
prudent and more promising policy will focus on promoting efficient pricing, eliminating 
unjustified subsidies, and otherwise encouraging flexibility and innovation in energy markets. 
Having endorsed the State Planning Office comments on energy policy in general, CMP 
endorses the five specific policy initiatives proposed in the article: 
(1) Promoting natural gas: Success in bringing additional natural-gas supply to Maine could 
offer economic and environmental benefits, including giving CMP another power-plant fuel 
option for existing units and a gas-turbine option for economical peaking capacity. 
(2) Expanding biomass use: Several studies, including one commissioned by CMP in the course 
of preparing its Energy Resource Plan, indicate that the biomass harvest from the Maine woods 
could be significantly increased without threatening the sustainability of the resource or running 
undue risk of supply pressure from competing uses. Success would reduce reliance on imported, 
non-renewable energy sources. The trade-offs, however, could include increased carbon-dioxide 
emissions and exposure to energy-supply shocks such as blight or sudden changes in harvesting 
or reforestation regulations by future policymakers. 
(3) Preserving the energy-export option: Maine exports education, fish, forest products, granite, 
insurance coverage, blueberries, and other goods and services. There's no reason the list 
shouldn't include energy, so long as price signals aren't being distorted and appropriate 
environmental safeguards are observed. Apart from offering increased employment here, 
increasing energy exports could help reduce the revenues that Maine electric companies must 
raise through sales in Maine. 
(4) Increasing transportation efficiency and fuel options: These are both useful suggestions, so 
long as mandates for efficiency and alternative fuels are based on a reasonable calculus of costs 
and benefits. 
(5) Promoting cost-effective conservation: Both the proposal for bond-financing for efficiency 
projects whose energy savings will more than cover debt service, and the proposal to energy-rate 
buildings are sensible. The first would promote Maine's overall energy efficiency and economic 
well-being with minimal distortion of market mechanisms; the second would actually enhance 
market operation by offsetting consumers' tendency to expect irrationally high rates of return on 
energy-saving investments and by encouraging more favorable financing for well-rated 
structures.  
In the spirit of the Silkman/Flumer-felt essay, CMP would suggest one additional proposal, 
followed by a policy question: 
Countering the NIMBY Syndrome  
As the State Planning Office authors observe, "Consumers expect all the services and benefits 
energy provides... but exhibit a growing intolerance for the infrastructure that is necessary to 
deliver those services," whether from not-in-my-backyard reflex or from concern over 
environmental or health issues. 
CMP can testify to the truth of that remark, even though its ample supply of generating capacity 
removes any need to fight for siting new power plants for years to come. But consumers also 
object to transmission lines and substations. It took more than a decade to win local approval to 
upgrade a line into one coastal town to ensure that minimal reliability standards could be met. 
Another town insisted that CMP run transmission lines across a river by affixing them, 
expensively, to a bridge rather than impinge on the view with overhead lines. 
The authors propose increased consumer education on needs, costs (including the notion that 
conservation efforts are free), and tradeoffs to counter this tendency. That's an effort that needs 
to be pressed and expanded, but it won't change the minds of the hard-core NIMBY opposition 
or the zero-risk/no-tradeoff absolutists on health and environmental issues. 
Such people are entitled to their opinions. But at some point society has to draw a line beyond 
which opposition and obstruction by individuals, groups, or local governments will not be 
allowed to delay or deny an energy project that has satisfied all the tests of need and suitability 
that the general public's representatives have required. 
The need to address that issue led to legislation creating a facilities-siting council in 
Massachusetts with broad powers to determine the need for and location of energy facilities. 
CMP has endorsed similar but less sweeping legislation for Maine. 
That's not a call for trampling anyone's rights or making local governments mere pawns of 
Augusta, although legally, towns are creations of the state and are subject to its control in any 
case. 
Such a reform would simply recognize and remind citizens of the fact that the franchise of a 
public utility like CMP carries legal obligations with it. For CMP, that includes the obligation to 
be ready with safe and adequate facilities to meet the electric demands of the nearly three-
quarters of Maine's population that lives and works in its 11,000-square-mile service area. 
It would be not only inconsistent with legislative intent, but a disservice and possibly a hardship 
to hundreds of thousands of consumers, if obstructionist tactics by a few localities delayed or 
prevented the construction, or inflated the costs of necessary facilities that had satisfied all the 
requirements of the state government, which created the general obligation to serve. 
At first glance, the siting issue may look like a real-estate quibble for gangs of competing 
lawyers. It isn't. None of the SPO's useful suggestions for good policy and specific initiatives can 
achieve their full effect if no counter-weight is applied to the growing forces of obstruction that 
threaten the goal of an adequate and economical energy supply. 
On a related note, CMP would suggest that anyone considering the adequacy of Maine energy 
policy raise a policy question: 
Is economic regulation coordinated with socio-political policy? 
The overriding motive behind our system of public-utility regulation is economic: to protect 
consumers against the market power of natural monopolies, and to promote affordable and stable 
rates over the long term. 
The complex processes of litigating revenue requirements, reviewing the prudence of 
management decisions, and determining the reasonableness of additions to rate base all hinge on 
economic tests. 
It's getting increasingly common, however, for regulated utilities to be forced to seek economics-
tested recovery of expenses they incur for social or political reasons. 
Excavating prehistoric campsites as part of hydroelectric relicensing and altering power-line 
routes to mitigate visual impact, to cite two examples, are responses to policy decisions that may 
be commendable from many points of view. But none of them fits neatly into the framework of 
economic regulation, and some may conflict with its objectives. 
As uncoordinated mandates are handed to public utilities, they increase pressure on prices. 
Silkman and Flumerfelt note the way that policies intended to promote the use of indigenous 
energy resources and conservation have had this effect. 
The paradoxical result of policy pressures on price is that the utility may also be pressed into 
service as a surrogate welfare agency. In October 1991, CMP was ordered to prepare to assign 
income-and-usage-determined credits to the bills of 10,000 very low-income customers for 
whom electric service has become unaffordable. The estimated $2.8 million annual cost will be 
passed on to other customers. 
The plight of these low-income customers is real, and the policy response is understandable. But 
one reason their situation drew the attention of legislators (who instructed regulators to mandate 
this program) is that the costs of complying with non-economic policy mandates is driving up the 
price of electricity. 
Further, carrying out this new social program will grate against other long-standing regulatory 
policies: that rates be cost-based, and that they not include inter-customer subsidies. Because 
electric bills are based on usage rather than ability to pay, raising rates to carry out socio-political 
mandates necessarily means accepting a lower level of equity and efficiency than if the socio-
political agenda were funded through taxes, which do purport to be based on ability to pay. That 
result has disturbing implications for Maine's attractiveness to new or expanding businesses, the 
engines of job creation, if they are sensitive to energy costs. 
Regulated energy companies are creatures of public policy and must carry out its mandates. That 
makes them attractive vehicles for shifting or obscuring costs, even at the risk of inflating or 
misallocating those costs. 
Somehow and soon, social policy and economic regulation have to be coordinated, with a clear 
eye fixed on costs and tradeoffs, before a new set of marching orders is cut. An anarchy of 
agenda-driven mandates invites economic decline, hardship, and consumer revolt. 
With a one policy proposal added and a policy question emphasized, the Silkman/Flumerfelt 
essay can stand as a realistic and useful handbook for anyone thinking about the direction Maine 
energy policy should take in the 1990s.  
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